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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERNEST L. STALEY, 
Respondent, 
vs. 
W. C. GRANT, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
1. That the decision of the District Court allowing 
plaintiff damages 1aJS prayed for was. against the ~aw and 
evidence in 'Said cas:e. 
2. T1Iat the plaintiff wrus guilty of contributory 
negligence as a matter of law and not entitled to recover 
damages for his failure to keep a proper or any lookout 
as he drove his automobile and approa0hed the inter-
section ·of State Street and 9th South Street, public 
streetls in s·a.lt L·ake City, Utah, 1and that he failed to 
keep ·a proper or ·any lo1okout as he stopped at the north 
curb line of s:a.id 'intersection and as he dr'Orve· his ·automo .. 
bile south through said intersection. 
STATEMENT OF F·ACT 
rr'h1a:t on ~he night of the 22nd day of Augus~t, 1952, 
at about the hour of 10 :30 o'clock P.M. thereof, at the 
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intersection of 9th South and State Stree1t, public s-treets 
in Salt Lake City, S'alt L'ake County, s.tate of Utah, the 
defendant who rs the appellant and will be referred to 
here·after as the defendant wrus driving his Hudson 
' automobile along and upon 9t!h South Stre·et going fr1om 
eirust to west and a;s he ap·proached the said intersection 
he sto·pp:ed back of and behind a yeliow taxicab that \Vas 
waiting for the semaphore to turn fron1 the red to the 
green l'ight; that when the light changed to green he 
followed the· yellow cab into the said inters.ootion going 
we·st a.nJd 'the cab turned 'S'Oruth at about the center of 
State Street hut before the defendant could turn and 
follow him through and turn completely south, the traffic 
imme·diately starte:d going from wes:t to east and it was 
so 1heavy that it caus.e:d 'the defendant to stop and hold-
. up facing tl1e ·southwe'st approximately under the said 
semaphore until said traffic had ceased and cleared and 
it was safe for him to p·roc.eed on s.outh; that he started 
up and was proceeding southward when he was hit by 
plaintiff's car .. that was traveling south, in said inter-
section at said time and place. 
That 'the plaintiff, who i's the respondent and will 
be referred to h·ere:after ·a:s the p·laintiff, alleges that 
he 'Stopped his ca.r at the northw·est si~de of the curb-
line of said inte.rse.ction in the lane next to the ce·nter 
of State Street, and iliat he was driving one of three cars 
that were stopp~e:d in said lane waiting for the semaphore 
to turn fron1 red to the green light; that there was one 
car i1nmediately in front and a car inunediately in back 
of him; that when the light changed to green the three 
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cars proceeded through the intersection going from north 
to south. The first car, a Mercury, was ahead of plain-
tiff's ·car and was the first to go through; that plaintiff's 
car reached the center of the said intersection or about 
under the se1naphore when the defendant drove his car 
from the ea1st going west against the red light and collid-
ed with plaintiff's car dan1aging the left front side there-
of; that the rear end of plaintiff's car had been shoved to 
the rsouthwe'st for about eight or ten feet with the front 
end of s·aid ear remaining where it wa1s when the ears 
came together with the front end ·of defendant's car 
right up against the front side of pl·aintiff''S car; that 
there weTe no skid m·arks exce-pt those made by the rear 
wheels of plaintiff's ear; that visibility was good; that 
traffic was 'heavy at iliat hour; 'that the intersection was 
dry and that the hea;dlights were in good working order, 
and that plaintiff did not see defendant's car until the 
instant uf the collision. 
ARGUMENT 
As to the vi1si~on of the pl'aintiff: There may have 
been a ear to the right of him, ye:s ( Tp. 15) ; that he did 
not observe any other traffic except the C'ar ahe'ad of 
him and that the intersection was. clear and tlrat he S'aw 
nothing in the inteT'section at all, ( Tp. 15) ; that at the 
moment of imp:act he saw the defendant and di'd nort 
llave time to do anything until he was hit, (Tp. 16); that 
he 'S'aw defendant'~s car five or six feet away; that he did 
not know what drew his attention ·to it but he did see it 
just before he was hit, (Tp. 20); that he saw the defen-
dant'~s car at the same instant he was hit, (Tp. 23); that 
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he di1d not ·s·ee ·defendant's car leave the east side of the 
interse·ct'ion an·d that plaintiff never saw defendant's car 
on the East ·at anytime or at any place until the impact, 
(Tp·. 25) : 
Mr. llunsaker v.rho testifie'd for plaintiff testified 
that both the plaintiff''S car (X2) ·and defendant's car 
(XD) and the ear he was riding in (X3) and car (Xl) 
were stopped at one and the same time, but that he diid 
no1t 'See the ·defe·ndant's car approach .the intersection o~ 
e;ome to a rstop·, and if that irs the cas.e, defendant's car 
w·as ·stop~ped an'd had been stopped on the go or green 
light,-·an'd as unusu'al a:s this alleged conduct was, 
n.either the plaintiff and the witness Davis, ~driver of car 
(X3) s·aw it either stopp·e:d at the edge of t:he intersec-
tion or as it started up and slowley moved into the 
interrse.ction, going from east to we.s.t, or as it pulled up 
to the inter'section an'd stopped or at any time. 
As to witness Davis: He te·stified that he was driv-
ing hrs car (X3) directly back of plaintiff's car (X2) 
and that he did not ~see de.fendant''s car (XD) until the 
time 'Of the collision; that he could not s~ay whether 
defendant's ear was going from east to west to make a 
left turn south or whether ,defendant's c'ar was in the 
center of the said intersection stopped and partially 
turrre1d s:outh or m'Oving in that direction. However he 
said defenldant's car wa,s making a left turn; that he did 
not ·s.ee defendant's car parked or stoppe1d at the north-
eas.t edge of the northerust curb lin·e of the intersection 
and that he did not see the ear move or travel ·slowly into 
the intersection going fron1 east to west; that his vision 
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was clear and unobstructed; that he was driving car'e-
fully, a.n'd that he was frank and honest enough to admit, 
that if a car had been so n1oving at that time and pl'ace 
as he entered the inter'secti!on and proceeded south he 
would have seen it, Tp. 5-46-48-49). 
Plaintiff's witness, Hunsaker, testified that defen-
dant's car was ·stopped and then came through the red 
light and hit the plain:tiff',s car in the center of the inter-
sect~on. I think we have a right to a)ssume that when 
the light turned green on the sem·aphore that the north 
boun!d traffic ( Tp. 8-12-26-27-28) 'an'd the south boun1d 
traffic started ·simultaneously to move acr'os:s the inter-
section in both directions; that if ·defendant's car entere1d 
the said inter;section a,s Hunsaker 'Says, shortly after hi's 
car (X3) entered then the. plaintiff's car wHich preceeded 
him was well into the intersection. That being the case, 
with traffic being admittedly heavy, the north bound 
traffic reached the center line at about the same time 
car (XI) reached it and was passing the center line when 
plaintiff's car arrived at the center. If that is a reason-
able inference to be drawn from the facts, then how could 
deefndant drive his car, starting from a dead start, out 
in front of the north boun'd traffic and hit the plaintiff, 
(Tp. 38-39). Hunsaker also says that he had no idea of 
the relative speeds of the cars; then he said the defend-
ant's ear was going fast for being in low gear, (Tp. 41). 
How did he know it was in low gear~ 
There is nothing in the records to indicate tllat 
either car 'vas going other than very ·slow and there is 
nothing in the record inconsi·stent with defendant's testi-
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lllOny When he SaY'S he was in the centHr of the s·aid 
intersection going ·southwest after ~stop·ping for traffic 
going from west to east to clear · and that he started 
up again going a little better than 'a 1nile ·an hour when 
he was hit, or as the evidence 'Shows that p~iaintiff drove 
into the front of defendant's car and that ·defendant was 
going s:o ·slow that plantiff's car was shove-d and pushed 
and that the front end of plaintiff'·s car did not mo;ve 
from the point of imp·act. 
It was at the center of the intersection when p~lain­
tiff and the witne·s.s Davrs first 1S'aw the defendant's car 
and Mr. D·avis ~said ·he was turned or was turning south 
and the plaintiff ·als:o indicate:~ the same fact. There 
is no dispute between the defendant, witness Davis and 
the ·plaintiff as to defendant's car being in the center of 
the intersection, because. 'that is.: where the· defendant 
said he was and that is where the other two firs.t saw 
him. 
s.earch the record through and you will not find one 
scintilla of evidence. to support the fact that there was 
an element of ·surp.rise or shock in it, 'or anything what-
soever that shows or in:dieate·s or tends to show or indi-
cate that the accrdent hap·pene1d with ·such speed or sud-
denne,ss that the plaintiff was taken completely -off guard 
and wa;s helpless to ·do ·anything abo~ut it. If there was 
a sudden surpri'se it was because the plaintiff was not 
driving with due care, caution and circumspection, and 
beeause he faile•d to keep any or a proper lookout for 
others that might be 1naking use of the streets, crossings 
and intersecti'On's - an!d not ·because of any undue- speed 
of either ·automobile. 
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The court m-ade a finding that the plaintiff did not 
see the defendant's car until it was within four feet of 
plaintiff's ear. A car going five miles an hour travels 
at the rate of seven feet per second, and if the :defendant 
or plaintiff was traveling five miles an hour the ·plaintiff 
saw him about a half 'Second before the collision. If ·a 
car was going ten miles per hour it is traveling at the 
rate of fifteen feet per secon1d and if the ·defendant or 
plaintiff was traveling that fast the plaintiff saw him a 
little less than one third of a second before the impact. 
The evidence and the court's finding based upon the 
evidence makes it impossible for it to be otherwise then 
that the impact between the two cars took place simul-
tanously with plaintiff seeing defendant's car and that 
is the only tune that he saw defendant's car. 
I can hardly see, under all the facts and Clrcmn-
stances, h:ow reasonable minds coul!d differ as to the 
rnatter of :defendant's car being seen by the plaintiff if he 
had been keepmg a proper-lookout, or by anyone. else 
who was about to enter the intersection from any diree-
tion. That being the case how could the minds of re:ason-
able men differ as to the plaintiff being guilty of contrib-
utory negligence for not keeping a proper lookout. Under 
all the evidence it is impossible to place the defendant's 
car in any position at the edge of or in the intersection 
\vhere it is not vi·sible at all times ha:d the p~aintiff been 
half looking. Defendant satd that he ·drove his ear into 
the in te r~ection on the green light and was turning to go 
south on State Street, but because of the west-east traffic 
that had the right of way, he was. force1d to stop at the 
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center of the intersection, partially turned to the south. 
Is there any doubt that under those circumstances. that 
his car should have been seen. If the ·defendant, as Mr. 
Hunsaker testified drorve his ear in low gear into the 
' intersection on the red light about the same time or 
slightly after plaintiff'·s car had entered, then certainly 
he shou~d have been seen; if nothing else, defendant's 
erratic driving should have drawn plaintiff's attention to 
him. 
In the case of J ackson-vs-Cook, 181 So. 195, the 
court had this to say: 
"This makes it clear ·enough we think, that 
we did not intend to, and did not, set the well 
recognized and settled rule that the duty of those 
in charge of motor cars and engines to look ahead 
and observe never cease1s; that what they can see 
they must see an~d in legal contemplation they do 
see; that their failure to see what they could have 
seen by the exercise of due diligence does not 
absolve them from liability." * * * In Minor-vs-
Stevens, 118 P313, the court sai!d: "If the plain-
tiff saw. the ·automobile before it struck her, or 
by rea~sonable use of her senses could have seen 
it in time to avoid the injury, she could not re-
eove:r.'' 
I have discussed with other l·awye~s the decisions 
of this court relative to tl1e law on right of way, proper 
lookout, p-resumptions that others will lawfully obey 
the traffic rules arrd re·gula tions and other traffic dif-
ficultie:s, particularly at intersections, an'd I fin,d them 
as equally confused a:s I an1 myself. I believe there is 
an opinion of this court that takes a squint at the same 
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thing. If that is true then a lawyer cannot advise a 
client as to his traffic rights and responsibilities with 
any degree of certainity, and he is left to pure specula-
tion. 
I have read 1nany and divers decisions of the ap-
pellant courts and you can find any and all kinds and 
variations of complexions, sliadings, colorings and mic-
roscopic d~stinctions, an·d some with simple traffic prob-
lems being complicated and involved by so1ne seemingly 
ponderous opinions that are intended to display a judge's 
philosophy of an infinite variety of detail to the con-
fusion of the lawyers and the trial courts. It is refresh-
ing to run on to an opinion that is not confused by some 
fancy and weighty thinking - that is simple, direct and 
uil!derstandable; that conforms. to an old established rule 
without trying to compromise or dilute it or water it 
down because of a shading and d:Ustinction that is S10 
faint that you can hardly discern it. However, some 
judges feel called upon to distinguish this kind of case 
and they go far afield with a seemingly long, logical and 
convincing opinion that woul1d not hold up under the 
scrutiny of a talented penetrating judicial mind. 
The problen1s in this case is a very silnple one and 
it asks this court whether or not a driver of a car ought 
to or shoul~d see what there is to be seen if he is keeping 
any or a proper lookout~ and if he is not keeping any 
or a proper lookout whether he is guilty of contributory 
negligence as a 1natter of law~ To 1ne, any court that 
relaxes the rule of keeping a proper lookout, a.s ex-
ercised by a reasonable prudent man under the same or 
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similar circu1nstances is O'uilty of creating a snare that 
' _b 
will have a tendency to lure pedestrians an:d motorists 
to their da1nage, injury or death. Human nature and 
1nechanical devises being what they are an~d as defective 
and full of faults as tl1ey are, no one should be permitted 
to assume or presume anything without seeing the object 
upon which their assumption is based - if it is there to 
be seen and can be seen with due diligence; that no 
driver of an auto1nobile or pedestrian should be per-
mitte1d to relax a proper lookout because he is favored 
with a signal, light, sign or favored highway or for any 
other reason, because he not only has his own safety to 
look after but the safety of others that are using the 
streets and highways. If he is to do that then he should 
not be lulled into a sense of security by any legal or 
traffic device or signal, human or n1echanical. 
The doctrine of the traffic presump·tion is only a 
subterfuge and an excuse for not keeping any or a prope·r 
lookout an1d it is the one way that the courts have of 
excusing ·such contributory negligence. Then some of 
the de1cisions and opinions get into the very weighty and 
deep proble1ns of "proximate cause" of the damage or 
injury and they begin to speculate, guess and conjecture 
as to whether it vvas due to not looking, or looking and 
not seeing, or relying upon an unseen p.resumption that 
didn't jell, and then they finally get to the point where 
they are so confused about the driver who couldn't see 
for looking and causing his auton1obile to co1ne into 
contact with a car that vvas not there, and then they throw 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
up their hands and say, this proximate cause business 
is a question for the jury. 
I do not want to be misunderstood, for I firmly be-
lieve that a driver is entitled to his presumption that 
others will use the public streets lawfully and carefully, 
but he is only permitted to indulge in the presumption if 
he is free from negligence and keeping a proper lookout, 
and he bases his presumption upon on what he sees and 
nothing else. 
It is only the untoward things that happen that 
cause and bring about accidents whe-re negligence is 
involved, and drivers of automobiles and pedHstrians 
should be ever alert and vigilant to detect the unusual 
and the untoward on the part of others so that accidents, 
injuries an1d property damage can be avoided and 
averte'd. Everyone using the highways and public streets 
owe that duty to .one another, and I 1do not believe that 
it is good law for some decisions of our courts to allo~ 
or permit a dereliction of that duty by hiding it back of 
the s:o called presumption. 
I drive on the ·defensive as I and everyone else 
should drive and if my thinking remains the same I 
will rely upon my senses and particularly upon my vision 
(eyes) rather than take a chance on making any pre-
sumptions no matter how appetizing the courts try to 
make them - to make up the difference. I will feel 
negligent indeed if I ever have to rely upon or substitute 
a presumption for not looking and ke·eping a proper look-
out, even with the court granting me that right. 
11 
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A little study .and son1e observations of human na-
ture tell's you that you cannot put your trust in a p·re-
sumption and the n1o1nent it is indicate:d that a presump-
tion is wrong then you should do everything to avoid 
damage and injury and render har1nles'S if possible the 
mistakes, inadvertance and bad judgment of a fellow way-
farer. Driving is risky business and is risky enough with-
out having some of our courts emu1la.te Rip· Van Winkle 
and set him up as a goo:d example under the ·doctrine of 
the presmnption. You could say sleep p·eacefully on the 
presumption will always attend you, .and you can always 
get to a jury no matter how sound you sleep. 
I think I have read most of t;he decisions of this 
court dealing with inte·rsections and crossings that have 
been written within the last twelve to fifteen years and 
I have picked the following cases upon which I rest 
the instant case: Bullock-vs-Luke, 98 P2 350; Farrell-
vs-Cameron, 94 P2 1068; Hickok-vs-Skinner, 190 P2 514 
(over ruled) ; Conklin-vs- Walsh, 193 P2 437 and Glen-vs-
N orton 213 P2 556. The Bullock opinion was written in 
1940, when we had less modern art .and music an'd very 
little be-bopp; when intellectuals were few and Joe Mc-
Carthy was unheard of. It is a plain, short simple 
opinion that even I can understan·d and so far as I am 
conce-rned it holds that you cannot ·drive into an inter-
section without looking and seeing what there is to be 
seen and should ·be seen and if you fail to so drive in 
such a manner you are guilty of contributory negligence 
as a 1natter of law. These eases were quoted in another 
case and they 'vere distinguished and resolved very 
12 
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readily, but I do not find it as easy .as that and I must 
confess that I have found it rather difficult to make the 
distinctions, so hence my confusion. I might venture a 
prediction and say that judging fron1 a few of the court's 
decisions that have been written and if the trend con-
tinues the Bul1lock case will be over ruled. 
The duty to keep a proper lookout applies as 
well to the favored a.s to the disfavored. * * * The 
duty of keeping a proper lookout attends all those 
operating motor vehicles, and other rules of the 
road ·do not relieve any driver of the necessity 
of complying with this requirement, Conklin-vs-
Walsh, 193 P2 437. He is bound to look to the 
left as well as to. the right for approaching 
vehicles. If he has reason to think that because 
of the other drivers negligence he will not be 
accorded the right of way, it becomes his duty to 
do what he can to avoid a collision, as by stopping 
or turning aside, failure to do which is contrib-
utory negligence, 5 AJ 667, 21 ALR 988, 37 ALR 
509, 47 ALR 613. 
There is a volummous note to be found in 164 ALR 
26, which makes a full and complete cove·rage of traffic 
difficulties at intersections under any and all traffic 
conditions and circumstances and you can find, if I do 
not miss my guess, autho~rities to substantiate any point 
of view or preconceived notion that one entertains 
concerning intersection cases. Take your choice. 
I sub1nit that the plaintiff was contributorily guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law for not keeping any or 
a proper lookout and failing to see what there was to 
be seen and should have been seen .and could have seen 
13 
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if the plaintiff had been looking, and I feel, from an 
examination of the- dec~sions of this court, that tliey 
have confused the trial courts as to the 1natter of a p-roper 
lookout. 
14 
Respectfully submitted 
HORACE. C. BECK, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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